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Assessing  Farmers' Attitudes
Toward Risk Using
the "Closing-in" Method
Sharon K. Bard and Peter J. Barry
The 1996 Farm Bill and low commodity prices have regenerated interest in the
impact of risk and farmers' risk attitudes on production agriculture. Previous research
has used  expected  utility theory (EUT)  and direct  elicitation  of utility functions
(DEU) for eliciting risk attitudes.  To overcome the criticisms  of EUT and DEU, a
recently developed technique called the "closing-in" method is adapted for eliciting
farmers' risk attitudes. This method is applied to Illinois farmers by using a compu-
terized decision procedure, and is validated by comparing the results to the farmers'
self-assessment  of their risk attitudes and score to a risk attitudinal scale.
Key words: "closing-in" method,  computerized decision procedure,  farmers' self-
assessment, probability-space framework, risk attitudes, risk attitudinal scale, scien-
tific elicitation
Introduction
Agricultural producers make decisions in a risky environment resulting from production
(weather,  disease,  pests,  etc.),  market  and  price  (input  and  output),  and  financial
(interest rates) uncertainty. How farmers manage these risks is greatly influenced by
their attitudes  toward  or willingness  to take risk. In turn, research  has found that
farmers' risk attitudes  influence  aggregate  commodity  supply response (Chavas and
Holt  1990,  1996; Holt and Moschini), financial structure  (Gwin, Barry, and Ellinger),
marketing decisions (Eckman, Patrick, and Musser), enterprise organization, and a host
of other agricultural characteristics (Barry; Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson).  Global-
ization of the agricultural markets,  innovations in the technological  base of the food
system, changes  in the government farm program, and low commodity  prices have
changed the risk farmers face  and regenerated  interest in the impact of risk and
farmers' risk attitudes on production agriculture.
Knowing  how farmers  react to risk  is important  to farmers,  educators,  industry
members,  and policy makers.  If farmers' risk attitudes are known, risk management
strategies and educational programs about risk and risk management strategies can be
tailored to the farmers' tolerance for risk. Industry participants such as insurance pro-
viders, seed companies, lenders, and financial counselors benefit from knowing farmers'
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risk attitudes when developing insurance policies, marketing new seed varieties, and
creating  financial  services.  Policy makers  like to know how  much  risk farmers  are
willing to take when evaluating the demand for or the effectiveness  of programs that
address risk.
Considerable research has addressed farmers' attitudes toward risk by using different
underlying  theories  and  elicitation  methods  such  as  the  modified  von  Neumann-
Morgenstern and the Ramsey procedures (e.g., Halter and Mason; Anderson, Dillon, and
Hardaker; Young; Collins, Musser, and Mason). Expected utility theory (EUT) has been
the most widely used theoretical framework for eliciting farmers' risk attitudes. How-
ever, its validity has been questioned due to observed violations of the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms (Kahneman and Tversky; Machina 1982,  1987; Schoemaker) and
observed difficulty of accurate utility measurement (Robison). To overcome these EUT
violations and elicitation  criticisms, generalized  utility theories (Camerer  1989) and
alternative methods for eliciting risk attitudes have been developed (Camerer 1992; Hey
and Strazzera;  Hey and Di Cagno; Abdellaoui and Munier  1994a).
We apply a recently developed elicitation technique called the "closing-in" method for
eliciting farmers' attitudes toward risk (Abdellaoui and Munier  1994a). The method-
ology incorporates a generalized utility theory framework and an elicitation process to
overcome the criticisms of EUT and the limitations of the methods traditionally used in
eliciting  risk attitudes.  The  following  sections  discuss  the  study's background,  the
theoretical framework adapted to address EUT criticisms, and the "closing-in" method.
This new technique  is implemented by eliciting farmers' attitudes toward risk using a
computerized  decision procedure.
Eliciting Risk Attitudes
Expected utility theory is probably the most widely used theoretical framework in
economic modeling of decision making under uncertainty.  The theory originated from
Bernoullian utility analysis and was more fully developed by von Neumann and Morgen-
stern. The objective function for the Bernoulli utility function is stated as:
n
(1)  E(U)=  ppU(x),
i=l
where pi is the probability that the ith outcome will occur, and xi is the value of the ith
outcome.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern  axioms state that the utility function must be ordered,
continuous,  and independent.  Ordering implies  that a  numerical  scale exists  which
represents  a person's preferences over gambles  (more preferred gambles have higher
numbers). The ordering property implies stronger properties: completeness and transi-
tivity. Continuity requires that for each outcome, xi, between xl and xn, the person can
name a probability,pi, such that he or she is indifferent between gettingxi with certainty
and playing  a  lottery  [in  a two  outcome  case,  the lottery is represented  as pxl and
(1 -p)x2]. Independence assumes that if  two gambles (e.g., X and Y) are equally prefer-
able, then the lotteries composed of ap chance ofX(or Y) and a 1 - p chance ofZ (a third
gamble)  are also equally preferable.  This implies that X ~ Y and pX + (1 - p)Z - pY +
(1 - p)Z (where - indicates indifference). The continuity and independence axioms make
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the numerical utility of a gamble equal to the expectation of the utilities of the gamble's
possible outcomes:
(2)  EU = pU(x1)  + (1 -p)U(x2).
If a decision maker's behavior is consistent with the von Neumann and Morgenstern
axioms, she will weight outcomes of action choices according to a personalized and unique
function U(x), with the highest value being most preferred.  The EUT provides a single-
valued index that orders  choices according to the decision maker's preferences or atti-
tudes toward risk (Robison et al.). If the axioms hold, von Neumann and Morgenstern's
theorem follows that an optimal risky choice is based on the maximization of expected
utility.
Subsequent research questioned the validity of the EUT model due to observed viola-
tions of its axioms such as Allais' paradox which violates the independence axiom (Allais).
Young, and King and Robison also cite operational problems with the application of EUT
to the direct elicitation of risk attitudes. Criticisms include bias arising from different
interviewers, complexity of the elicitation process, and selection of inappropriate func-
tional forms of the utility function resulting in undesirable implications. These problems
prompted the development of alternative theories that relax one or more of the axioms
(Schoemaker; Machina 1982). These theories, including Machina's generalized expected
utility, Chew and MacCrimmon's  weighted utility, and Becker and Sarin's lottery-
dependent  expected utility, have been presented in probability  space utilizing a unit
triangle (Camerer  1989).
Within the probability-space framework, a range for the decision maker's indifference
curve is measured and a range of risk aversion can be calculated. Because this method
does  not require  a specific functional  form for the utility function to be  specified,  it
avoids the problems inherent in parametric tests of both the functional form and the
original hypotheses. Researchers have developed various methods for measuring one's
indifference curve, but, except for Bar-Shira, the implementation of their methods has
been limited to the economics field (Camerer 1989,  1992; Hey and Strazzera; Hey and
Di Cagno; Abdellaoui and Munier  1994a, 1994b, 1998).
Elicitation of Risk Attitudes in  Probability Space
The  probability-space  approach  to analyzing  risk attitudes  was  first presented  by
Marschak in 1950, and further developed by Machina (1982, 1987). Consider three out-
comes: XL, XM, and XH (low, medium, and high) with objective probabilitiespL,pM, andpH,
such that XL  < XM  <XH.  Outcomes  are represented  by degenerate  lotteries that give  a
certain result with probability one (Spi = 1). Since the sum of the probabilities cannot
exceed one, andpM  is implicitly represented bypm = 1 - PL - PH' the set of feasible proba-
bilities can be represented by points in the unit triangle in the PL :pH plane as in figure
1. The set is bounded by the lines PL = 0 (left edge), PM = 0 (the hypotenuse), and PH  = 0
(the lower edge). Upward movements in the triangle increase PH at the expense of PM
(i.e., shift probabilities from outcome XM up to XH), and leftward movements decreasepL
to the benefit ofpM (shift probabilities from outcome XL up to XM). These movements (and
more generally all northwestern movements) lead to stochastically dominating lotteries
and would accordingly be preferred.




0  PL  1
Figure 1.  Indifference curves assuming expected utility
Individuals' indifference curves in the (PL :P)  diagram are given by the solution to:
(3)  EU:U*  = pU(x L)  +  PMU(XM)  +  pHU(xH).
SubstitutingpM = 1  - PL -PH and rewriting the above in slope-intercept form produces:
U  - U(XM)  U(M) - U(L)
U(XH)  - U(xM)  U(XH)  - U(xM)
The slope of the line tangent to an indifference curve at a point is given by:
~~(5~)  .dpH  _  U(XM) - U(XL)
dpL  U(XH)  - U(xM)
Since the slope dpHldpL is a constant,  depending only on the relative  utilities of the
three outcomes, the indifference curves are straight lines with the same slope as shown
in figure 1.1 The indifference curves express attitudes toward risk. The slope measures
by how muchpH a person needs to be compensated for an increase inpL (or the "price" of
risk) (marginal rate of substitution ofpH forpL or the shadow price of probabilistic units
of the highest valued gamble in terms of  probabilistic units of the lowest valued gamble).
The more preferred indifference curves lie to the northwest (due to xL < xm < XH), implying
that in order to know an expected utility maximizer's preferences over the entire tri-
angle, it suffices to know the slope of a single indifference  curve.
One  way to look  at measuring risk attitudes in probability  space  is to consider  a
gamble, G, and a transformation of G with a probability masspM of 0.10 shifted from the
middle outcome, xM, to each of the extreme outcomes, XL  and XH,  so that the choices are
either G or (PL  + 0.10; PM - 0.20; PH + 0.10). Four gamble pairs are listed in table 1 and
portrayed in figure 2.
This presentation draws from the expected utility axioms of completeness,  transitivity, and continuity. The axioms imply
that any two points in a triangle are either on the same indifference curve or on two different indifference curves (complete-
ness), indifference curves  do not cross within the triangle (transitivity of preferences),  and there are no open spaces in the
indifference  map (continuity).
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Table 1.  Gambles with Outcomes
G (Less Risky)  H (More Risky)
Pair No.  PL  PM  PH  PL  PM  PH
1  0  0.6  0.4  0.1  0.4  0.5
2  0  0.6  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.6
3  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.3  0  0.7
4  0.2  0.2  0.6  0.3  0  0.7
XH = $
PH
M =  $5  PL  XL 
= 0
Figure 2.  Indifference curves and iso-expected  value line
The original gamble (G) is the less risky set, and the transformed gamble (H)  is the
more risky set. A payoff level (XL,  xM, XH) of (0; $5; $10) is used. Since these gambles are
a mean-preserving spread (same expected value), the straight line connecting the gambles
is the iso-expected value line. The brackets indicate the less and more risky gambles in
each pair. If a person, when presented with the first pair of gambles, G{0; 0.6; 0.4) and
H{0.1; 0.4; 0.5}, selects G, she is selecting the less risky gamble. Her indifference curve
must start below pointA and end above point B in the triangle (the dashed line in figure
2). This condition implies that her indifference  curve is steeper than the iso-expected
utility line, and that she is risk averse. If another person, when presented with the third
pair of gambles, G{0.1; 0.4; 0.51 and H{0.3; 0; 0.7}, selects H, he is selecting the more
risky gamble. His indifference curve must start below point D and end above point B in
the triangle (the dotted line in figure 2), implying that his indifference curve is flatter
than the iso-expected value line and that he is a risk seeker.
The relationship between indifference  curves presented in probability space and the
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (ARA) is presented in Bar-Shira. In the
case of one choice set, two lotteries, and three outcomes for each lottery, Bar-Shira stated
there is a one-to-one relationship between the slope of the indifference curve and ARA:
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(6)  ^f^ 1 (6)  U"(x)  2(8--1)
*  U'x) Vs  + 1 '
where s is the slope of the indifference curve [equation (5)].  This result is derived under
the assumption that outcomes are equally spaced and close to each other. By using the
relationship between the slope of the indifference curves and the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion, Bar-Shira calculated  a range for the coefficient of absolute risk aversion
for each farmer.
The "Closing-in" Method for Eliciting
Farmers' Risk Attitudes
The "Closing-in"  Method
Using the probability-space framework as the foundation, Abdellaoui  and Munier
(1994a) designed  a direct and systematic  estimation method  of deriving indifference
curves by experimental investigation called the "closing-in" method. The method requires
an interior point (e.g., L) and a segment L'L" in the triangle to be identified (figure 3).
It is possible to find a lottery equivalent to L on L'L" if the decision maker has prefer-
ences following the principle of first-order stochastic dominance.  To determine the point
lottery equivalent to L, a point such as L'"  on L'L" is identified. If L"'  L, the indiffer-
ence curve intersects between L'" and L ". Another point between L" and L"' is identified
and a preference  is indicated. A sufficient number of iterations, assuming continuity,
will lead to a satisfactory approximation of the point being searched.
This method utilizes point lotteries inside the triangle-an important issue because
the framework on which violations of the independence axioms were built utilizes lotter-
ies where one of the probabilities equals zero (i.e., the lotteries were located on one of
the boundaries of the triangle) (Machina 1987). Conlisk found that if the lotteries were
located in the triangle's interior, a certainty effect (termed by Kahneman and Tversky)
disappeared and the systematic inconsistencies did not exist.
To implement the "closing-in" method, Abdellaoui and Munier (1994a) developed inter-
active software called "Maclabex"  to allow subjects to select preferences between two
lotteries of three outcomes at different locations in the triangle. This approach permits
fields of indifference curves to be estimated. In their two subsequent papers, Abdellaoui
and Munier (1994b and 1998) implemented the "closing-in" method consistent with the
methodology presented in their earlier work.
Application to Eliciting  Farmers'  Risk Attitudes
The "closing-in"  method developed by Abdellaoui and Munier (1994a)  is used to elicit
risk attitudes from farmers based on the direct and systematic  estimation  of a slope
range within which each subject's indifference curve will fall. Once the slope range is
calculated,  a range for the coefficient of absolute risk aversion can be calculated using
equation (6).
To elicit risk attitudes from farmers, an elicitation process was designed to create a
"familiar" decision setting for grain marketing that would enhance the realism of a
farmer's decision process and the reliability of the resulting risk attitude measure. The
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Figure 3. The "closing-in" method:  Figure 4. The "closing-in" method
Constructing an indifference curve  with lottery points
participating farmer was presented with two options for marketing 320 acres  of corn.
The farmer was told to assume a 150 bushel/acre yield, the decision time to market was
just prior to harvest, and the two options differed due to the methods for pricing the crop
(i.e., forward contracting, hedging with options, and cash sales).
Each marketing option represented a lottery, denoted by probabilities that summed
to one. The payoffs for the lotteries were ($125,000;  $135,000; $145,000),  and the two
marketing options differed in expected value and risk. The first marketing option was
represented by the lottery A  = {0.20; 0.60; 0.20}  (comparable to the interior point L in
figure 3). The more risky gambles lay on the segment  connecting gambles B =  10.20;
0.15; 0.651 and K= 10.65; 0.15; 0.201 (figure 4). The farmers could not indicate indiffer-
ence between marketing plans (they had to decide how to market their crop); therefore,
an exact slope of the indifference curve was not calculated. To determine the upper and
lower bounds into which each farmer's indifference curve fell, an initial point, F = {0.40;
0.15; 0.45), was defined.  The subject had to indicate a preference  between A and F. If
A  >  F, the subject's indifference curve lay above F.
To further narrow the location of the indifference curve above F, another lottery point,
D, was then identified, and the subject was asked to indicate his preference between A
and D. The participant  continued to indicate a preference between two lottery points
until the upper and lower bounds we re  identified. Depending  on the degree  of risk-
averse or risk-seeking behavior, a subject answered three to five questions. The probabil-
ities were reported in 0.05 increments to avoid difficulties of considering probabilities
in smaller denominations (i.e., 10.22; 0.56; 0.221). The lotteries for each point are shown
in table 2.
Abdellaoui and Munier implemented their "closing-in" method by presenting questions
in a diagram of two urns representing each gamble. To implement the scientific elicita-
tion method to farmers, an Excel macro written in Visual Basic was developed to con-
sider the grain decision marketing situation. The program opened with an introduction
to the elicitation process, described the hypothetical marketing situation, stated the
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Table 2.  Point Lotteries
LOTTERIES
Payoff  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K
$125,000  0.20  0.20  0.25  0.30  0.35  0.40  0.45  0.50  0.55  0.60  0.65
$135,000  0.60  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15
$145,000  0.20  0.65  0.60  0.55  0.50  0.45  0.40  0.35  0.30  0.25  0.20
Table 3.  Summary of Participating Farmers'  Demographics
Category  Description
Number of participants  86 farmers
Average  age  46 years old
Average number of years farming  22 years
Average number of years in school  15 years
Average number of dependents  4 dependents
Most frequent category for gross farm income  $200,000 to $499,999
Number of the following farm types:
* Field crops  71 farms
· Livestock  (beef, hogs, etc.)  13 farms
· Other  2 farms
Average number of acres cropped  1,144 acres
Average percentage of off-farm income  21%
Most frequent category for net worth  $250,000 to $500,000
Most frequent category for debt-to-asset ratio  30% to 50%
assumptions, and offered an example. For each decision between the two marketing plans,
a written description and a column bar chart were provided for each marketing option.
After the bounds of the indifference curves were identified, the program concluded with
a thank you for the farmer's participation. This elicitation technique was implemented
on laptop computers.
The "closing-in" method was applied to 86 Illinois farmers participating  in Illinois'
Farm Business Farm Management program during January and February 1998. Table
3 gives  an overview  of the participating farmers' demographics.  The average  farmer
participating in this study was in his mid-40s, had four dependents (including himself),
had some college education, farmed 1,144 acres, and had a net worth ranging from
$250,000 to $500,000. Approximately  83% of the farmers were cash grain producers.
The "closing-in" method generated  11 ranges in which the indifference curves could
fall. Two extreme ranges imply negatively sloped indifference curves. These alternatives
were included in the program to provide the complete universe  of potential  answers.
However,  a negatively sloped indifference  curve  is counter to economic theory. Three
respondents selected a series of marketing plans implying their indifference curves lay
beyond B, and two farmers selected marketing plans implying their indifference curves
lay beyond F. Despite the attempt to explain clearly the concept of probabilities and the
questions' objectives,  it is possible that the respondents did not clearly understand the
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Table 4.  Summary Statistics for Three Risk Assessment  Methods
Standard  CARAa
Item  Average  Median  Mode  Deviation  Maximum  Minimum  Range
Self-Assessment Score  5.31  5.00  4.00  1.55  8.00  2.00
Attitudinal  Scale  3.80  3.80  3.80  0.69  5.30  2.10
Scientific Elicitation  3.98  4.00  4.00  1.64  7.00  1.00  0.795-0.367b
a Coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
b  The range of CARA in which the average response for the scientific elicitation fell.
objective of the questions or the implications of their choices. Therefore, due to the highly
unlikely event of negatively  sloped indifference curves and the potential of misunder-
standing the concept of probabilities and gambles, the five observations with negatively
sloped indifference curves were excluded from the remainder of the analysis.
Table 4 presents statistics on the remaining 81 observations for the "closing-in" method,
as well as two additional methods utilized to validate the "closing-in"  technique.2 The
mean for the scientific elicitation is 3.98, while both the mode and median are 4. A score
of 4 for the scientific elicitation portion indicates that the respondent preferred gamble
A, implying that his indifference curve intersects the line BK somewhere between points
E and F (figure 5). An indifference curve intersecting the line between F and G implies
risk neutrality; therefore, this sample of farmers was on average moderately risk averse.
The coefficient of absolute risk aversion for each indifference curve is calculated from
equation (6).  The range of coefficient values in which the average response fell is from
0.795 to 0.367, also indicating moderate risk aversion.
Gambles A, E, and F have expected values of $135,000, $136,500, and $135,500 with
respective standard deviations of $6,325, $9,096, and $9,206. In selecting gamble E over
A, the farmer is choosing a gamble with a larger expected value but with greater risk.
This is consistent with the first-order stochastic dominance efficiency criterion.
Validation
Self-Assessment and Attitudinal Scale
To compare and validate the "closing-in" method, two additional techniques for eliciting
risk attitudes were implemented: (a)  a self-assessment of the farmer's risk attitude, and
(b) a risk attitude score resulting from an attitudinal scale. These measures were elicited
from the sample farmers through a written questionnaire completed by the participants
at the same time as the scientific elicitation.
The self-assessment question was included to further the understanding of the rela-
tionship associated with self-assessment, an attitudinal scale, and a scientifically elicited
measure. The self-assessment question  scale was from 0 to 10, with 0 representing an
attitude of "wanting to avoid risk as much as possible," and 10 representing an attitude
of "willing to take  as much risk as possible." A score  of 5 implied risk neutrality. A
respondent's self-assessment could be influenced by what that individual feels is socially
2  The results for the other methods are discussed in a subsequent section.





Figure 5.  Average  range of indifference curves
desirable or may be a reflection of what the person wishes to be. Consequently,  a self-
assessment measure may not be an accurate measure of a respondent's  true attitude
toward risk.3
The third method for eliciting farmers' attitudes toward risk was an attitudinal scale.
The scale consisted of statements that empirically correspond to a single social-psycho-
logical  dimension  (in this  case,  risk  attitude).  Theory  suggests  that risk  attitudes
influence the way farmers manage the risk inherent in production agriculture. There-
fore, it is hypothesized that attitudes toward mechanisms or tools used for managing
risk reflect the producer's  risk attitude.  Based on previous research  (Patrick et al.;
Patrick and Ullerich; Patrick and Musser; Blank and McDonald), 25 questions address-
ing different  methods  for managing financial,  production,  and  marketing risk were
formulated.  Scores to the statements were summed to represent a final score for the
individual's risk attitude.4 The overall score could span from highly risk-averse (a score
of 0) to risk-neutral  (5) to highly risk-seeking (a score of 10).
Comparison of  Elicitation  Methods
As indicated  in table 4, the sample farmers,  on average,  self-assessed  themselves  to
have significantly lower risk aversion (risk-preferring on average) than under the atti-
tudinal scale or scientific elicitation approaches (5.31 versus 3.80 or 3.98, respectively).
While the scientific elicitation scores exhibited the widest range of scores, the responses
to the attitudinal scale displayed the narrowest range of variation.
Table  5 presents the correlation coefficients  associated with the three elicitation
methods. While all three correlations for the scores are positive, the correlation between
the attitudinal scale and the scientific elicitation was the only significant statistic. The
3Schurle and Tierney compared farmers' self-assessment score to a score resulting from an interval survey approach and
found the farmers assessed themselves to be more risk-seeking than their behavior indicated.
4  Details of the methodology implemented for the scale and the self-assessment method are presented in Bard and Barry.
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Table 5. Correlations Associated with the Three Risk Assessment  Methods
Elicitation Measure  Self-Assessment  Attitudinal Scale
Attitudinal Scale  0.027
Scientific Elicitation  0.175  0.317*
*  Significant at the 99% level.
low correlations between the farmers' self-assessment and the attitudinal scale and the
scientific elicitation scores imply that farmers' perceptions of themselves are not highly
consistent with their implementation of risk management tools or scientifically based
attitudes toward risk.
Schurle and Tierney compared risk attitude measures elicited from a self-rank
question, the interval method, and a set of 20 true-false questions designed by Farley
to create a risk attitude score. Their sample of 90 farmers assessed themselves as being
slightly risk-seeking, while the Farley scores and the interval survey results indicated
the farmers were slightly risk-averse. In addition, Schurle and Tierney found a positive
but insignificant correlation between the self-assessment and the Farley score, and a
negative  and insignificant correlation  between the interval measure  and the Farley
score. The correlation between the Farley score and the self-rank question was positive
and significant. Our result of a higher average self-assessment score than the other two
methods (more risk-seeking) is consistent with Schurle and Tierney.  However, while
Schurle and Tierney found significant and positive correlation between the Farley score
and the self-ranking, we found that the attitudinal scale was significantly correlated to
the "closing-in"  method, not the self-assessment score.
Conclusions  and Implications
Due to the criticisms of expected utility theory (EUT) and previously developed methods
of direct elicitation of utility functions  (DEU), a new elicitation technique called the
"closing-in" method has been adapted to elicit farmers' attitudes toward risk. Because
this scientific elicitation method does not require that a functional form for the utility
function be specified, it avoids some of the shortcomings of  the expected utility hypothesis
as the underlying theory. In addition, the elicitation technique utilizes a methodology
that addresses some of the criticisms of EUT and DEU.
The "closing-in" method was applied to Illinois farmers to elicit their attitudes toward
risk. The participating farmers were also asked to self-assess their attitudes toward risk
and responded to an attitudinal  scale about risk management tools. The  responding
farmers, on average, self-assessed their risk attitudes as slightly risk-seeking. However,
their responses to utilization of risk management tools and the "closing-in" method indi-
cated mild degrees of risk aversion. The higher self-assessment score and insignificant
correlation coefficients for the self-assessment question and the other elicitation methods
further indicate that a respondent's  self-perception is not an accurate measurement of
the underlying attitude or belief. Psychometricians also caution against the use of single-
item measurements  such as the self-assessment question due to their insufficient
measurement properties.  Therefore, it  appears that the risk attitude scale and the
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"closing-in" method are more valid measurements of risk attitudes than self-assessment.
If a self-assessment question is used to measure risk attitudes, the practitioner should
keep in mind its measurement weaknesses.
The "closing-in" results are comparable to previous studies of farmers' risk attitudes.
In general, studies using DEU, the interval approach, observed economic behavior, and
the  experimental  approach  have found  risk aversion  to  be  the  most prevalent  risk
attitude among farmers, and the "closing-in" method results are consistent with those
findings. However, the similarity of the results at the aggregate level does not diminish
the potential contribution of the "closing-in" method to research and education of risk
in agriculture.  This elicitation method is applied using a computer and can be imple-
mented without lengthy explanation and within a short time frame. Thus, it allows for
wide-scale, low-cost application in areas traditionally not possible, such as the Internet,
and for large groups of participants. This new elicitation method can provide an oppor-
tunity to gain further insight into the behavior exhibited by farmers facing risk and
uncertainty in agriculture going into the 21st century.
[Received March 2000; final  revision received October 2000.]
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